An Eye That Gazed Towards Zion..
Erev Rosh Hashana..
29 Elul 5779..
Wishing one and all,
a Shana Tovah,
a year of Besorot Tovot,
a year of redemption for Am Yisrael,
and Eretz Israel.
Uploaded by letzshmo on May 30, 2011
Al Kol Eleh Words:
Naomi Shemer
Melody: Naomi Shemer
Sunday, September 29, 2019
Friday, September 27, 2019
The controversy over HBO's "Our Boys" - by Ricki Hollander
A series that exaggerates and inflates certain parts of the story while ignoring the other parts, and that misrepresents the details is one that strays far from the truth. The problem is that the series purports to represent an honest and factual history of what happened. And its deviation from that fundamental is precisely the reason for all the criticism and controversy.
Ricki Hollander..
CAMERA..
26 September '19..
CAMERA generally avoids addressing fictional TV shows, but the latest Israel-focused HBO series, “Our Boys,” claims it is “based on the true events which led to the outbreak of war in Gaza” during the summer of 2014 and interweaves truth with fiction. It has become so mired in controversy that CAMERA has reviewed the complete 10-episode series and explains why there is controversy surrounding it.
The Events of That Summer
The summer of 2014 was a traumatic time in Israel. On June 12, 2014, three Israeli teenagers – 16-year-olds Naftali Frenkel and Gilad Shaer and 19-year-old Eyal Yifrah – were kidnapped from a hitchhiking post in Gush Etzion (in the West Bank) by Hamas operatives. An extensive search operation, dubbed “Operation Brother’s Keeper,” was launched by the IDF and the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet): Troops combed the area in search of the boys, targeting the Hamas terrorist infrastructure and arresting its members. Meanwhile, the nation banded together in solidarity with the families of the boys, praying for their safe return. A social media campaign, with hashtag #BringBackOur Boys, went viral, raising global awareness of the terrorist kidnapping and inspiring prayer on the victims’ behalf.
The agonizing search for Naftali, Gilad and Eyal continued for 18 days until July 30th, when security forces discovered their dead bodies buried in a field belonging to Hamas members near Hebron. After initially denying responsibility for the abduction/murders, a senior Hamas official later took credit for it, praising the “heroic action of the Kassam Brigades (Hamas’ armed wing).”
(Continue to Full Article)
Ricki Hollander..
CAMERA..
26 September '19..
CAMERA generally avoids addressing fictional TV shows, but the latest Israel-focused HBO series, “Our Boys,” claims it is “based on the true events which led to the outbreak of war in Gaza” during the summer of 2014 and interweaves truth with fiction. It has become so mired in controversy that CAMERA has reviewed the complete 10-episode series and explains why there is controversy surrounding it.
The Events of That Summer
The summer of 2014 was a traumatic time in Israel. On June 12, 2014, three Israeli teenagers – 16-year-olds Naftali Frenkel and Gilad Shaer and 19-year-old Eyal Yifrah – were kidnapped from a hitchhiking post in Gush Etzion (in the West Bank) by Hamas operatives. An extensive search operation, dubbed “Operation Brother’s Keeper,” was launched by the IDF and the Israel Security Agency (Shin Bet): Troops combed the area in search of the boys, targeting the Hamas terrorist infrastructure and arresting its members. Meanwhile, the nation banded together in solidarity with the families of the boys, praying for their safe return. A social media campaign, with hashtag #BringBackOur Boys, went viral, raising global awareness of the terrorist kidnapping and inspiring prayer on the victims’ behalf.
The agonizing search for Naftali, Gilad and Eyal continued for 18 days until July 30th, when security forces discovered their dead bodies buried in a field belonging to Hamas members near Hebron. After initially denying responsibility for the abduction/murders, a senior Hamas official later took credit for it, praising the “heroic action of the Kassam Brigades (Hamas’ armed wing).”
(Continue to Full Article)
Thursday, September 26, 2019
Saluting PMW's great success: Fatah’s terror promoting Facebook page closed
Following PMW’s two major reports and a two-week public pressure campaign, as of this morning Fatah’s Facebook page is no longer accessible. Yesterday Palestinian media accused PMW of “waging a new war against the Fatah Movement’s Facebook page,” while the editor of Fatah’s page defended its terror promotion
Itamar Marcus..
Palestinian Media Watch..
25 September '19..
Following Palestinian Media Watch's two major reports and a two-week public pressure campaign, Fatah’s terror promoting Facebook page is closed as of this morning. PMW's campaign started in February this year when we released a detailed report about Fatah’s Facebook page documenting its terror glorification and incitement to violence during 2018. The report showed that Fatah’s content was in direct violation of Facebook’s guidelines. Inexplicably, Facebook refused to close the page at that time.
PMW followed up with a new report released earlier this month, documenting the terror promoting content on Fatah’s Facebook page during the first 6 months of 2019, which was likewise sent to Facebook. In addition, PMW also launched a public social media campaign with many partner organizations worldwide, developed by volunteers at ACT-IL, which was aimed at Facebook's directors, urging them to close down Fatah’s page. The campaign included daily tweets and Facebook posts showing Fatah’s terror promoting content on Facebook, and also included a public campaign through which individuals and organizations sent a pre-written letter of protest to Facebook. Thousands of ACT-IL activists from 74 countries and other PMW partner organizations sent thousands of emails to Facebook's policy directors, and made thousands of reports directly on the page through Facebook.
As of this morning Fatah's Facebook page is down, and this is the response when trying to access the page:
(Continue to Full Post)
Itamar Marcus..
Palestinian Media Watch..
25 September '19..
Following Palestinian Media Watch's two major reports and a two-week public pressure campaign, Fatah’s terror promoting Facebook page is closed as of this morning. PMW's campaign started in February this year when we released a detailed report about Fatah’s Facebook page documenting its terror glorification and incitement to violence during 2018. The report showed that Fatah’s content was in direct violation of Facebook’s guidelines. Inexplicably, Facebook refused to close the page at that time.
PMW followed up with a new report released earlier this month, documenting the terror promoting content on Fatah’s Facebook page during the first 6 months of 2019, which was likewise sent to Facebook. In addition, PMW also launched a public social media campaign with many partner organizations worldwide, developed by volunteers at ACT-IL, which was aimed at Facebook's directors, urging them to close down Fatah’s page. The campaign included daily tweets and Facebook posts showing Fatah’s terror promoting content on Facebook, and also included a public campaign through which individuals and organizations sent a pre-written letter of protest to Facebook. Thousands of ACT-IL activists from 74 countries and other PMW partner organizations sent thousands of emails to Facebook's policy directors, and made thousands of reports directly on the page through Facebook.
As of this morning Fatah's Facebook page is down, and this is the response when trying to access the page:
(Continue to Full Post)
Wednesday, September 25, 2019
What should Israel’s goal in Gaza be? - by Daniel Pipes
Should Israel invade Gaza? Why Israel must map out a strategy to achieve its goals.
Daniel Pipes..
Washington Times..
23 September '19..
As Israeli frustration mounts about violence coming out of Gaza, the idea of a ground invasion, and once and for all to finish with Hamas aggression, becomes more appealing. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has endorsed this approach, saying that “There probably won’t be a choice but to topple the Hamas regime.” While sympathetic to this impulse, I worry that too much attention is paid to tactics and not enough to goals. The result could be harmful to America’s foremost Middle East ally.
Attitudes toward Gaza are in flux. Efraim Inbar, the strategist who heads the Jerusalem Institute for Security Studies, for years advocated “mowing the grass” as “Israel’s strategy for protracted intractable conflict.” By this, he advocated an occasional reminder to Hamas’ rulers and other Gazans of Israel’s overwhelming power. Implicit in this approach is an acceptance that, most of the time, Israel accepts aggression from Gaza, with its attendant damage to property and life. As recently as May 2019, he dismissed the Palestinian threat to Israel as a “strategic nuisance.”
But Mr. Inbar recently recognized the high costs of this passivity and now calls for a “restricted ground invasion” of the territory: Why? Because “a short-term ground operation will bring better results than Israel’s activity thus far [i.e., mowing the lawn]. We need to maneuver inside enemy territory, locate them, and destroy them, or tie the hands of its members.”
Others agree. For example, Ayelet Shaked, leader of the New Right party, calls for a widescale military operation in Gaza: “We must choose the time that is best for us, evacuate the Israeli citizens who live in towns along the Gaza envelope in order to give us maximum flexibility, and we must uproot the terror from within Gaza.”
To these analyses, I respond with Carl von Clausewitz’ simple but profound counsel: First decide on your policy, then your strategy, then your tactics. Or, in plain English: Start by figuring out what you wish to achieve through the use of force, then decide the broad outlines of your approach, then the specific means.
Seen in this light, debating whether to engage in a ground invasion and to overthrow Hamas is debating a tactic; this should not be the topic of conversation until the goal and the means to achieve it have been decided upon. To start by focusing on tactics risks losing sight of the purpose.
So, what should Israel’s goal in Gaza be?
(Continue to Full Column)
Daniel Pipes (DanielPipes.org, @DanielPipes), president of the Middle East Forum, taught “Strategy and Policy” at the U.S. Naval War College.
Daniel Pipes..
Washington Times..
23 September '19..
As Israeli frustration mounts about violence coming out of Gaza, the idea of a ground invasion, and once and for all to finish with Hamas aggression, becomes more appealing. Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has endorsed this approach, saying that “There probably won’t be a choice but to topple the Hamas regime.” While sympathetic to this impulse, I worry that too much attention is paid to tactics and not enough to goals. The result could be harmful to America’s foremost Middle East ally.
Attitudes toward Gaza are in flux. Efraim Inbar, the strategist who heads the Jerusalem Institute for Security Studies, for years advocated “mowing the grass” as “Israel’s strategy for protracted intractable conflict.” By this, he advocated an occasional reminder to Hamas’ rulers and other Gazans of Israel’s overwhelming power. Implicit in this approach is an acceptance that, most of the time, Israel accepts aggression from Gaza, with its attendant damage to property and life. As recently as May 2019, he dismissed the Palestinian threat to Israel as a “strategic nuisance.”
But Mr. Inbar recently recognized the high costs of this passivity and now calls for a “restricted ground invasion” of the territory: Why? Because “a short-term ground operation will bring better results than Israel’s activity thus far [i.e., mowing the lawn]. We need to maneuver inside enemy territory, locate them, and destroy them, or tie the hands of its members.”
Others agree. For example, Ayelet Shaked, leader of the New Right party, calls for a widescale military operation in Gaza: “We must choose the time that is best for us, evacuate the Israeli citizens who live in towns along the Gaza envelope in order to give us maximum flexibility, and we must uproot the terror from within Gaza.”
To these analyses, I respond with Carl von Clausewitz’ simple but profound counsel: First decide on your policy, then your strategy, then your tactics. Or, in plain English: Start by figuring out what you wish to achieve through the use of force, then decide the broad outlines of your approach, then the specific means.
Seen in this light, debating whether to engage in a ground invasion and to overthrow Hamas is debating a tactic; this should not be the topic of conversation until the goal and the means to achieve it have been decided upon. To start by focusing on tactics risks losing sight of the purpose.
So, what should Israel’s goal in Gaza be?
(Continue to Full Column)
Daniel Pipes (DanielPipes.org, @DanielPipes), president of the Middle East Forum, taught “Strategy and Policy” at the U.S. Naval War College.
Tuesday, September 24, 2019
Who Would've Thought? A BDS Defeat The NY Times Found Not Fit to Print - by Ira Stoll
...There’s a structural bias to journalism encapsulated in the old newsroom saying, “write about the hotel that’s burning down, not the hotel that didn’t burn down.” So to some degree the decision by Times editors to emphasize the boycott votes that pass rather than the ones that fail may be driven by a general desire to focus on news that does happen rather than news that doesn’t happen. But that’s the most generous possible face to put on what operates functionally as an anti-Israel bias.
Ira Stoll..
Algemeiner..
23 September '19..
Some of the most telling stories are the ones The New York Times doesn’t print.
In that category falls the recent decision of a section of the American Political Science Association to reject a resolution calling for a boycott of Israel.
Miriam Elman, a political scientist on leave from Syracuse University who is the executive director of the Academic Engagement Network, which opposes boycotts of Israel, wrote a Facebook post reporting, “The proponents of a discriminatory anti-Israel academic boycott resolution (and its accompanying obnoxious FAQ) experienced a colossal defeat.”
She wrote, “This spectacular fail needs to be advertised WIDELY, as we all know that BDS zealots will either try to bury it or spin this as some kind of remarkable victory”
“Bury it” was precisely the approach The New York Times took to the news.
(Continue to Full Column)
Ira Stoll..
Algemeiner..
23 September '19..
Some of the most telling stories are the ones The New York Times doesn’t print.
In that category falls the recent decision of a section of the American Political Science Association to reject a resolution calling for a boycott of Israel.
Miriam Elman, a political scientist on leave from Syracuse University who is the executive director of the Academic Engagement Network, which opposes boycotts of Israel, wrote a Facebook post reporting, “The proponents of a discriminatory anti-Israel academic boycott resolution (and its accompanying obnoxious FAQ) experienced a colossal defeat.”
She wrote, “This spectacular fail needs to be advertised WIDELY, as we all know that BDS zealots will either try to bury it or spin this as some kind of remarkable victory”
“Bury it” was precisely the approach The New York Times took to the news.
(Continue to Full Column)
Sunday, September 22, 2019
The strategic price of Israel’s political instability - by Caroline Glick
Israel’s prolonged political volatility and uncertainty has had a disastrous impact on Israel’s strategic flexibility.
Caroline Glick..
Israel Hayom..
20 September '19..
Link: https://www.israelhayom.com/opinions/the-strategic-cost-of-israels-political-instability/
When Yisrael Beytenu Chairman Avigdor Lieberman abruptly resigned his position as defense minister last November and started the countdown to the Knesset elections in April, he plunged Israel into a state of political instability. Following the April elections, by refusing to serve in a government led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and so forcing Israel into a second election, Lieberman prolonged the instability he instigated.
Tuesday’s elections ended in deadlock. Neither major party can form a governing majority. And so, there is no end in sight for the instability Lieberman provoked and prolonged.
Israel’s prolonged political volatility and uncertainty have had a disastrous impact on Israel’s strategic flexibility. Indeed, it has induced strategic paralysis. Israel cannot respond in a meaningful way to threats or take advantage of strategic opportunities that present themselves.
The implications of this dire state of affairs were brought to bear twice in one day during the campaign. In a press conference last Tuesday, Netanyahu announced his intention to apply Israeli sovereignty to the Jordan Valley after the elections. Netanyahu’s announcement included the revelation that US President Donald Trump supports the move. American officials backed his claim after the fact.
This was a stunning development. No US administration has ever supported Israel’s right to assert its sovereign rights in Judea and Samaria without Palestinian permission until now.
But the media and Netanyahu’s political opponents on the left and right ignored this basic fact and instead derided his statement as nothing more than a cheap election stunt to rally his base.
In a way, they were right. After all, all Netanyahu did was make a promise. But it was due to Israel’s strategic paralysis that he had no other option.
Lieberman’s resignation precipitated the Knesset’s dissolution in January with called for April. Trump had planned to release his peace plan late last year. The elections compelled him to delay its release. Lieberman’s refusal to join Netanyahu’s coalition in May forced Trump to again delay release of his plan.
So long as Trump hasn’t released his plan, Netanyahu has been constrained to announce any position on the permanent disposition of Judea and Samaria. Under the circumstances, declaring his intention to apply Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan Valley with American support was the best he could do. Anything more would have harmed Trump’s rollout. And Trump won’t present his plan so long as there is no government.
Tuesday evening, Netanyahu was delivering a speech in Ashdod when the Islamic Jihad in Gaza shot a missile toward the city. Netanyahu’s bodyguards quickly compelled him to leave the stage and seek shelter.
Islamic Jihad is an Iranian proxy. It does nothing without Iranian permission and often direction. So to all practical purposes, the missile strike on Ashdod was an Iranian strike. It was launched to advance Iran’s strategic goal of fomenting Netanyahu’s removal from office.
Blue and White party leaders Benny Gantz and Gabi Ashkenazi were happy to swallow Iran’s bait. They insinuated that Netanyahu was a coward for leaving the stage in the midst of the attack.
The public, which has grown tired of running for shelter from rockets and missiles, similarly voted, or chose not to vote, just as Iran had hoped.
Presumably recognizing the strategic significance of the attack, according to media reports, Netanyahu wished to respond with a strategic strike against Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in Gaza. But so long as Israel is in a state of strategic paralysis, there’s no point in going to war. There is no way to set, let along achieve military goals that can advance Israel’s strategic interests for the long haul.
As bad as things are in Gaza, the regional situation is many times worse, as last Saturday’s Iranian attack on Saudi Arabia’s oil processing plant at Abqaiq and its oil field at Khurais demonstrated.
Caroline Glick..
Israel Hayom..
20 September '19..
Link: https://www.israelhayom.com/opinions/the-strategic-cost-of-israels-political-instability/
When Yisrael Beytenu Chairman Avigdor Lieberman abruptly resigned his position as defense minister last November and started the countdown to the Knesset elections in April, he plunged Israel into a state of political instability. Following the April elections, by refusing to serve in a government led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and so forcing Israel into a second election, Lieberman prolonged the instability he instigated.
Tuesday’s elections ended in deadlock. Neither major party can form a governing majority. And so, there is no end in sight for the instability Lieberman provoked and prolonged.
Israel’s prolonged political volatility and uncertainty have had a disastrous impact on Israel’s strategic flexibility. Indeed, it has induced strategic paralysis. Israel cannot respond in a meaningful way to threats or take advantage of strategic opportunities that present themselves.
The implications of this dire state of affairs were brought to bear twice in one day during the campaign. In a press conference last Tuesday, Netanyahu announced his intention to apply Israeli sovereignty to the Jordan Valley after the elections. Netanyahu’s announcement included the revelation that US President Donald Trump supports the move. American officials backed his claim after the fact.
This was a stunning development. No US administration has ever supported Israel’s right to assert its sovereign rights in Judea and Samaria without Palestinian permission until now.
But the media and Netanyahu’s political opponents on the left and right ignored this basic fact and instead derided his statement as nothing more than a cheap election stunt to rally his base.
In a way, they were right. After all, all Netanyahu did was make a promise. But it was due to Israel’s strategic paralysis that he had no other option.
Lieberman’s resignation precipitated the Knesset’s dissolution in January with called for April. Trump had planned to release his peace plan late last year. The elections compelled him to delay its release. Lieberman’s refusal to join Netanyahu’s coalition in May forced Trump to again delay release of his plan.
So long as Trump hasn’t released his plan, Netanyahu has been constrained to announce any position on the permanent disposition of Judea and Samaria. Under the circumstances, declaring his intention to apply Israeli sovereignty over the Jordan Valley with American support was the best he could do. Anything more would have harmed Trump’s rollout. And Trump won’t present his plan so long as there is no government.
Tuesday evening, Netanyahu was delivering a speech in Ashdod when the Islamic Jihad in Gaza shot a missile toward the city. Netanyahu’s bodyguards quickly compelled him to leave the stage and seek shelter.
Islamic Jihad is an Iranian proxy. It does nothing without Iranian permission and often direction. So to all practical purposes, the missile strike on Ashdod was an Iranian strike. It was launched to advance Iran’s strategic goal of fomenting Netanyahu’s removal from office.
Blue and White party leaders Benny Gantz and Gabi Ashkenazi were happy to swallow Iran’s bait. They insinuated that Netanyahu was a coward for leaving the stage in the midst of the attack.
The public, which has grown tired of running for shelter from rockets and missiles, similarly voted, or chose not to vote, just as Iran had hoped.
Presumably recognizing the strategic significance of the attack, according to media reports, Netanyahu wished to respond with a strategic strike against Hamas and the Islamic Jihad in Gaza. But so long as Israel is in a state of strategic paralysis, there’s no point in going to war. There is no way to set, let along achieve military goals that can advance Israel’s strategic interests for the long haul.
As bad as things are in Gaza, the regional situation is many times worse, as last Saturday’s Iranian attack on Saudi Arabia’s oil processing plant at Abqaiq and its oil field at Khurais demonstrated.
Friday, September 20, 2019
When Gazan are victims of a cognitive war: Who cares? - by Arnold Roth
What happened in the end to those "wounded" Palestinian Gazan Arabs next to whose home the Palestinian Arabs rockets crashed? Hamas certainly knows. Its ministry of "health" knows too but isn't saying; that's not its job. The unfortunate family itself knows. But since they can only blame the heroes of the anti-Zionist revolution for what was done to them, their voices count literally for nothing in that blighted society. There are many such silenced voices in Gaza. In blunt terms, without intending to sound offensive or insensitive - when it comes to Palestinian Arab victims of Palestinian Arab terrorist violence, who cares?
Arnold/Frimet Roth..
This Ongoing War..
20 September '19..
Associated Press reported last night on something that happens often - much more often than even attentive followers of events in the Arab vs Israel conflict know - but that rarely gets reported even though it involves Palestinian Arab victims.
Because they're the victims of extreme Palestinian Arab malevolence, such events and their often lethal consequences go unnoticed.
We have reported on many dozens of them in this blog.We call them Fell Shorts.
The AP dateline is Jerusalem. It's worth recalling that almost everything that is reported from the Hamas-occupied Gaza Strip is based on what the Hamas regime chooses to announce. Reporters, to say it mildly, do not operate freely there.
Times of Israel bases its report of the same Fell Shorts on AP. But there are differences and they're also worth noting:
(Continue to Full Post)
Arnold/Frimet Roth..
This Ongoing War..
20 September '19..
Associated Press reported last night on something that happens often - much more often than even attentive followers of events in the Arab vs Israel conflict know - but that rarely gets reported even though it involves Palestinian Arab victims.
Because they're the victims of extreme Palestinian Arab malevolence, such events and their often lethal consequences go unnoticed.
We have reported on many dozens of them in this blog.We call them Fell Shorts.
Rockets fired from Gaza fall short, wound 7 Palestinians
By Associated Press
September 18 at 2:57 PM
JERUSALEM — Seven Palestinians have been wounded after a rocket barrage from the Gaza Strip exploded near a house inside the coastal enclave. Palestinian eyewitnesses said Wednesday that two of the three rockets struck outside a home in the southern city of Rafah, and a third fell near the fence separating Israel and the Gaza Strip. The Israeli military said it had identified “a failed launch attempt” from the Gaza Strip, but that no projectiles entered Israel. Gaza’s health ministry said seven people were wounded, but didn’t elaborate on their condition. It wasn’t clear which Palestinian militant group in Gaza was behind the rocket fire.
The AP dateline is Jerusalem. It's worth recalling that almost everything that is reported from the Hamas-occupied Gaza Strip is based on what the Hamas regime chooses to announce. Reporters, to say it mildly, do not operate freely there.
Times of Israel bases its report of the same Fell Shorts on AP. But there are differences and they're also worth noting:
(Continue to Full Post)
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